Regime Change By the Book

From Dictatorship to Democracy is an short work written in 1993 by Gene Sharp at the request of Tin Maung Win, an exiled Burmese writer. It was circulated among different groups, and has since been translated into 17 languages. Sharp's focus is nonviolent struggle against dictatorships, resistance movements, and political theory.

With a degree in political theory from Oxford, Sharp is a professor at Dartmouth, has worked with Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, and is founder of the Albert Einstein Institution.

After the protests in Iran two years ago, the Iranian government singled out Sharp as a key figure behind the unrest. (Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 29, "09) One of the items you can download from the Albert Einstein Institute is a list of 198 methods for nonviolent action. At the mass trial of Iranian reformists, the government stated that post-election protests were “completely planned in advance and proceeded according to a timetable and the stages of a velvet coup [such] that more than 100 of the 198 events were executed in accordance with the instructions of Gene Sharp.” There might be some support for this accusation. In May of 2009 there were 79 downloads of Dictatorship to Democracy in Farsi. In June, during the protests, the number spiked to 3,487. In 2007, Hugo Chavez accused Sharp of being part of a CIA-led conspiracy to overthrow his government.

In an NPR interview due to air Wednesday morning, Sharp made the following observations about the Egyptian protests:

"I was amazed when I saw, very early on in the Egyptian struggle, this testimony — 'we're not afraid anymore, we've lost our fear,' " Sharp says. "That is something Gandhi always advocated. He said 'cast off your fear.'

"Once a regime is no longer able to frighten people — to terrorize them into passive submission — then that regime is in big trouble."

Consideration of Sharp's writings can be placed within the context of regime change. A quick glance through the book brought to mind several cases where his work may have had an influence. These techniques have not always been successful, tough, so it seems that other considerations must be taken into account. Recent developments in technology play a role in protest movements reaching critical mass and in creating international awareness. (Those protest signs are in English for a reason.) The other thing to consider is the role of the military. If the army remains neutral, regime change has a chance of success.

"Courting Trouble" Pakistan's Judicial Activists

Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry is the most trusted man in Pakistan, according to polls. He has gained support for taking on Pakistan's unpopular president Asif Ali Zardari. A February 12 article in The Economist discusses concerns that the type of political activism shown by Chaudhry and the high court might be undermining Pakistan's fragile democracy.

Criminal proceedings against a sitting president are illegal in Pakistan, but Chaudhry has tried to get Swiss officials to reopen a corruption case against Zardari and he has gone after the president on technicalities. Populist causes have been quickly adopted. The Court recently ruled that an American diplomat accused of shooting two men to death in Lahore cannot leave the country, and he has ruled in favor of the controversial blasphemy laws. Chaudhry has lashed out at the IMF for its policies in dealing with poor countries. In the past, the courts have tried to fix the price of commodities. These positions and rulings suggest an attempt to gain public favor.

The courts have resisted political oversight and seem to have army support. The concern is that this may set the stage for a return of military rule in Pakistan.

Our discussion in class has included the importance of an independent judiciary. Is it possible for a judiciary to be too independent? We have a distaste in our country for judges who act like politicians, and both sides of the political spectrum rail against judicial activism. In a fragile democracy like Pakistan the balance of power can be easily upset, with potentially harmful results for the country.

"Yes, Minister"

The European Union actually has a foreign ministry, called the "External Action Service." The stated goal of the group is to respond to unexpected events. A recent article in The Economist Baronness Catherine Ashton, head of the organization, has come under fire for her lack of visibility and unwillingness to take a leadership role with fellow foreign ministers. She has been slow to call for free and fair elections in Egypt, a fact that some attribute to her desire for consensus among EU states.

The foreign ministers of individual EU states have not hesitated to take unilateral actions in a number of cases--banning visas and freezing assets of senior Belarussian officials, of the president of the Ivory Coast, and of the former president of Tunisia. This is an indication that the role of the EU is, at least for the present, limited to issues of the member states. When it comes to foreign affairs, the real power still lies with the individual states. There is no EU military force, so membership in NATO is the closest thing there is to having any sort of compulsive power when it comes to out-of-area actions.

This article brings to mind several questions. Is Baroness Ashton's view of her role typical of British domestic politics? It is typical for cabinet ministers in Britain to depend heavily on career civil servants, and the EU position might assume expertise in the field of foreign affairs. Is her reticence is a reflection of the British idea of "cabinet responsibility," where decisions are made behind closed doors and a united front is presented to the public? Is her lack of visibility indicative of a lack of support of EU policies within Britain?

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised (but it might be twittered).

Recent events in Tunisia and Egypt have brought discussions of the role of social media in bringing political change. A recent article in Foreign Affairs entitled "The Political Power of Social Media" points to the importance of social media as powerful organizing tools for civil society worldwide. The technologies are new and there are not yet enough examples to draw definitive conclusions about their effect. The author suggests that we should support an open internet and freedom of communication worldwide without using it for country specific or short term goals.

Social media has shifted the balance of power between the state and civil society by providing space for discussion and agreement among politically engaged citizens. For authoritarian regimes, the ability to create and disseminate political documents has turned "open secrets" into "public facts," and governments must now account for anomalies between its view of events and the public's. The prevalence of camera phones has made it harder for governments to carry out undocumented crackdowns.

Social media increases shared awareness, which creates a problem for those in power. This is commonly known as the Dictator's Dilemma. Shutting down Internet access or banning all cell phones during a crackdown risks radicalizing otherwise pro-regime citizens or harming the economy. Popular culture heightens the dilemma. Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society calls this "the cute cat theory of digital activism." We should work to heighten the dictator's dilemma by encouraging social media in general.

There are concerns about the effectiveness of social media in bringing democratization. Some see "slactivism." It is easy to sign on to a cause (Save Darfur) on Facebook when no further action is required. Another concern is that the state is gaining more sophisticated ways of monitoring and co-opting these tools. The result could be the strengthening of the authoritarian regime. There is also a potential for such technologies to be manipulated or used in dangerous ways. Al Qaeda, the Mexican drug cartels, the Mafia, and the Taliban are effectively using technology to bring new recruits, terrify local populations, and threaten democratic institutions.

The role of media and political participation fits into our discussion of Citizens, Society and the State.

Turmoil in Tunisia

The Economist reports that Tunisia is currently going through a period of turmoil that some have called it the jasmine revolution. Calling this a revolution might be a bit premature. Seventy-eight civilians have died and street protests have grown into something bigger than a revolt, but not quite yet a revolution. No one is sure whether this will lead to a multiparty democracy, to a military coup, or to a prolonged period of turmoil.

What started it? On Dec. 17 a jobless youth set himself on fire after police confiscated his vegetable stall in a small interior town. (The Economist reports a rash of copycat self-immolations elsewhere in North Africa.) Since then, protesters, trade unions, and other opposition groups have taken to the streets in large numbers. Images from cell phones and the Internet spurred the protests. On January 14, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (president for the last 23 years) was forced into exile. Growing oil wealth has been accompanied by increasing political repression and corruption that has particularly benefitted the Ben Ali family. The amount of money lost per year to corruption, bribery, and kickbacks is estimated to be over $1 billion per year. The police and ruling RDC party are technically still in control, but there has been a breakdown of order. In response civilians have set up voluntary guard units and things have calmed a bit. The current prime minister has announced that he will form a government and has offered concessions to civil liberties. Some would like to give the new government a chance, while others would like to see all RCD party members ousted.

The move away from the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali is an example of regime change, but we still do not know what is coming, so it is difficult to go beyond that assessment. Most definitions of a coup include some sort of reference to the military, but in this case the military seems to be staying on the sidelines. The police force had cracked down hard on the protesters. When the army forces were called in they refused to use force and so far have not taken played politics. By definition, a revolution is "a sudden and violent socioeconomic and political transformation that constitutes the most dramatic form of regime change." So far there has not been a dismantling of the political structure. The people are calling for reforms and for increased civil liberties, but the government structure itself has not been changed.

We might class Ben Ali's rule as a modernizing authoritarian regime. For some countries this seems to be a step in the process of democratization. The procedural democracy is established and in time the illiberal democracy is replaced by a liberal democracy. (South Korea and Singapore are examples.)

The most anger seems to be generated by the “jobless, jeans-clad youth against the ageing cynics in suits and uniforms.” Does this represent a major cleavage in countries with rapidly growing populations and an older generation determined to hang onto power at all expense? If so, this would be the case in many countries of the Middle East. (Iran comes to mind.)

Generational Change and the Future of U.S.-Russian Relations

from the Journal of International Affairs
Spring/Summer 2010

--A whole generation has no memory of the Cold War except as history, but many of the elite policy makers continue to view Russia through that lens. (We have maintained better relations with China than with Russia, even though China is less democratic and poses a bigger threat to our national interests.) Because they have not had the same period of respite that we have had, Russian youth continue to hold skeptical opinions about the United States.
--"The upheavals associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union have contributed to creating a younger generation in Russia whose values are in many ways sharply at odds with mainstream western liberalism." They tend to support Russia's power ambitions, its xenophobia, and its heightened sense of political efficacy--ability to have an impact in the larger world.
--Generational differences can also be seen in comparing Vladimir Putin to Medvedev. Putin is 15 years older and was a KGB agent serving abroad during the changes brought by Gorbachev. Medvedev is much more comfortable with an open society.
--Comparing the positions of John McCain and Barack Obama also shows a generational divide. McCain sought to expel Russia from the G8 and held a hard line on missile defense. Obama's position is more optimistic.
--Russian youth tend not to be involved in public activism. They are cynical and skeptical in their attitudes towards Russian political institutions, but more than 70% trust Putin. This suggests that they agree with their elders that Russia needs to be ruled with a strong hand.
--The Russian government has been able to mobilize young people through youth groups like Nashi which grew out of an earlier organization designed to support Putin. Nashi promotes a strand of xenophobia and has collaborated with far-right groups to attack anti-government activists.
--The Kremlin has intervened in education to "rehabilitate the image of Josef Stalin and to cover up some of the darker pages in the country's Soviet past."
--There has been an increase in attacks on ethnic minorities. One survey found that almost a quarter of youths supported "liquidation" of illegal immigrants in Russian cities.
--National and regional governments seem to be indifferent to the activities of right-wing groups.

(Photo from New York Times 02/03/09)

The production of hybrid or electric cars will require lithium, and Bolivia controls half of the world's known supply. Pressure is building in Bolivia to nationalize the lithium, but a new constitution could strengthen the claims of indigenous groups to that which lies in areas under their control. Bolivian President Evo Morales has already nationalized natural gas projects operating there, and has invested in a small lithium plant in an attempt to develop the mining operation. Bolivia will need outside investment in order to fully develop the lithium industry, but Morales' poor relationship with Washington may keep us on the sidelines. Morales treads a fine line as other lithium reserves are identified and/or alternative solutions are developed.